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Overconfidence and Risk Taking inForeign Policy Decision Making |
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Preface |
6 |
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Acknowledgments |
8 |
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Contents |
9 |
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List of Abbreviations |
10 |
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List of Figures |
11 |
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List of Tables |
12 |
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1 Introduction |
13 |
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2 The Relevant Literature on Past Outcomes, Overconfidence and Risk Taking |
20 |
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Manifestations of Overconfidence |
21 |
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Sources of Overconfidence |
23 |
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Past Outcomes and Decision Making |
23 |
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Case-Based Probability Judgments and Overconfidence |
25 |
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Self-Serving Attribution Bias and Overconfidence |
26 |
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Overconfidence and Risk Taking |
27 |
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Risk Taking and Failure |
27 |
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3 Modeling the Relationship Between Past Outcomes, Overconfidence and Risk Taking |
29 |
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Model Specification |
31 |
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Research Design |
37 |
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Case Selection and Data Collection |
38 |
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Variables and Their Operationalization |
39 |
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Political Shock |
39 |
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Foreign Policy Behavior |
40 |
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Perception of Performance in Past Outcomes |
40 |
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Use of Past to Resolve Uncertainty |
42 |
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Overconfidence |
43 |
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Risk |
44 |
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Policy Performance |
46 |
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4 The Turkish Policy to Remove Syrian President Assad: Overconfidence Obscures Risks and Magnifies Failure |
50 |
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Introduction |
51 |
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Historical Background |
51 |
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Past Outcomes Inform Future Actions |
58 |
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Manifestations of Overconfidence |
61 |
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Unrealistically Favorable View of Turkey |
62 |
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Better-Than-Average Effect |
63 |
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Excessive Reliance on Their Information |
64 |
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Unrealistic Optimism |
66 |
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Heightened Sense of Capacity to Control Outcomes |
71 |
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Risk Taking |
72 |
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Miscalibrations in Turkish Foreign Policy |
73 |
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Failing to See the Limits of Knowledge and Capacity to Control Outcomes |
73 |
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5 Why Turkish Overconfidence Was Too Obvious |
89 |
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Capability-Aspiration Gap |
90 |
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Weak Domestic Consensus: Polarized Society, Contentious Politics and Retrogressive Democracy |
95 |
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Regional Competition and Foreign Policy Obstacles |
100 |
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A Critical Assessment of the Outcomes of the Policy |
107 |
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Were Turkish Policy Makers Aware of the Fact That They Were Taking Risks? |
114 |
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Elimination of Alternative Explanations: What Impelled Turkey’s Overconfidence? Sense of Success Before the Uprisings, or in the Uprisings? |
115 |
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Wrapping Up: Overconfidence Obscures Risk and Magnifies Failure |
118 |
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6 Conclusion |
123 |
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Bibliography |
130 |
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Index |
143 |
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